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· What affects the perception of risk? 
 
· Are people affected by terrorism in 
the long run as well as the short run? 
 
· Do policy preferences change as a 
result of terrorism? 
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How Rational is the 
Response of Individuals 
to the Threat of 
Terrorism in Europe? 
Summary: In this Policy Briefing, we address two 
important  questions.  We  look  at  the  drivers  of 
concern  about  terrorism  and  find  that  beyond 
individual characteristics, it is also affected by the 
occurrence  of  terrorism.  When  distinguishing 
between permanent and transitory terrorism, the 
first has a much stronger impact than the first. The 
second  question  concerns  how  terrorism  affects 
the policy preferences of voters. We find that while 
a  higher  level  of  terrorist  concern  does  increase 
people’s willingness to trade off civil liberties for 
more  security,  a  singular  attack  has  only  a 
temporary effect. After only a few months, people’s 














Since security is often defined as ‘the feeling of being 
secure’ (Engerer, 2011), it is important to know what 
affects this perception of security. It is a known fact 
that  basic  characteristics  affect  an  individuals’ 
perception of the world around them and in this Policy 
Briefing  we  address  which  of  these  characteristics 
affect  their  level  of  concern  about  terrorism.  In 
addition  to  basic  characteristics,  we  also  look  at 
whether people respond to the actual occurrence of 
terrorism  in  their  country.  This  enables  us  to  see 
whether  the  expectations  concerning  terrorism  are 
behaving  in  sync  with  the  actual  threat  level  or 
whether  these  are  unrelated.  Using  the  London 
bombings as a case study, we further look at how the 
threat  and  occurrence  of  terrorism  affect  people’s 
preferences when it comes to security measures that 
may reduce civil liberties in exchange for a possible 
increase in the level of security. 
The  research  underlying  the  answers  to  these 
questions is studied in the EUSECON project, as well as 
the broader academic world. The results in this Policy 
Briefing are based on Bozzoli and Müller (2011) and 
Drakos and Müller (2010; 2011). Further research is 
referenced in these original studies. 
The difference between risk and concern 
When  it  comes  to  terrorism,  there  is  a  significant 
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Long-term trends drive the concern about 
terrorism more than recent events 
attack.  This  risk  is  driven  for  a  large  part  by  what 
policies there are aiming to prevent attacks and how 
effective  governments  are  at  disincentivising 
individual  terrorists  or  terrorist  groups  from 
participating  in  terrorist  activities  (Müller  2011). 
Typically, what is found is that economic hardship and 
social  exclusion  of  specific  groups  further  increases 
the  probability  of  terrorist  attacks  (Blomberg  et  al., 
2004). 
The concern regarding terrorism addresses a different 
question, however. It is embedded in the literature on 
hazard analysis, which argues that individuals are not 
necessarily  capable  of  assessing  the  ‘true’  risk  of 
whether  certain  unlikely  events  will  happen.  The 
perception of the risk of terrorism is interesting from 
a policymaker’s point of view since it is likely to drive 
policy preferences of individual constituents.  
What drives the concern over terrorism? 
Using the results of the annual Eurobarometer survey, 
it is possible to construct an indicator for the degree to 
which the citizens of different countries are worried 
about  terrorism  (more  details  in Drakos  and  Müller 
2010, 2011). Although the survey does not directly ask 
people about their degree of concern in this regard, it 
does ask respondents  the  following  question: “What 
do you think are the two most important issues facing 
(OUR  COUNTRY)  at  the  moment?”,  for  which 
respondents  can  choose  from  a  total  of 
thirteen  different  options.  The  indicator 
used in this analysis is the percentage of 
people who place terrorism among the top 
two major concerns.  
Looking at the basic results for the period 2003-2008, 
we can see large differences between countries. Across 
years  and  countries,  an  average  of  8  per  cent  of 
respondents considers terrorism to be a top concern, 
varying from 1 per cent in Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia to more than 64 per cent in Turkey and 
42  per  cent  Spain  in  2007.  Other  countries  scoring 
consistently  above  the  European  average  are 
Denmark,  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  This 
already points towards a highly plausible explanation: 
with the exception of Denmark, each of these countries 
has  a  rich  past  of  terrorist  activity.  However,  these 
averages hide the fact that there is also large within-
country  variation  over  time.  Only  19  per  cent  of 
Turkey’s respondents worry about terrorism in 2004, 
whereas 64 per cent of them do so in 2007. Another 
example is the Netherlands, which moves from being 
an average country in 2004 (9 per cent) to the third-
most worried country in 2005 with 31 per cent. 
In order to see the relationship between actual acts of 
terrorism  and  the  concern  about  terrorism,  these 
results are combined with data on terrorist attacks in 
the different countries. In addition to that, individual 
characteristics of the survey respondents are added as 
well  and  different  types  of  regression  analysis  are 
used  to  analyse  the  relationship.  The  occurrence  of 
terrorism during the year of the survey turns out to 
explain  about  20  per  cent  of  the  variation,  after 
controlling  for  the  fact  that  some  countries  are 
inherently more concerned. Furthermore, it is possible 
to disentangle the effects of the trend and the cycle in 
terrorist activity. That is, it is possible to distinguish 
the effects of having an inherently larger probability of 
terrorism  from  the  fact  that  during  the  survey  year 
there was more intense terrorist activity. The results 
show that while both effects play a significant role, the 
trend  effect  appears  to  be  much  stronger.  In  other 
words: respondents are driven more by intrinsically 
high levels of terrorism than by the short-term effects 
of recent attacks. 
In addition to these results, we can also examine what 
the individual characteristics are that make a person 
more  likely  to  worry  about  terrorism.  The  role  of 
education is relatively small, with only those with no 
completed  full-time  education  less  likely  to  mention 
terrorism as a primary concern. Gender and marital 
status seem to matter, with males and singles being 
both  less  likely  to  be  worried.  Self-employed, 
managers and holders of other white-collar jobs also 
have  a  lower  propensity  to  worry  about  terrorism. 
Rather interestingly, respondents living in rural areas 
show significantly higher levels of terrorism concern, 
although  one  would  expect  their  risk  exposure  to 
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British willingness to trade off civil liberties for 
more security did not permanently increase 
Figure 1 Risk of terror and willingness to trade civil liberties 
Finally, since the variable of interest used is chosen 
from  a  set  of  optional  risk  drivers,  we  can  look  at 
whether any of those risks influence the probability of 
mentioning terrorism. One can imagine after all that 
somebody  with  increased  worries  concerning  other 
factors  may  be  less  likely  to  mention  terrorism.  It 
turns out the probability of mentioning terrorism as a 
risk factor is barely associated with other risk drivers. 
London attacks as a case study 
The attacks on London on July 7, 2005 can be used as a 
case study to see what effects such an attack have on 
individuals’  perceptions  of  security  and  their 
preferences regarding security provision (more details 
in Bozzoli and Müller 2011). Using the data from the 
British  Social  Attitudes  Survey  2005,  it  is  possible  to 
study what the difference is between pre- and post-
7/7  responses.  This  survey  asks  two  relevant 
questions concerning the perceived level of risk. First, 
respondents are asked what they think the likelihood 
is of a future attack and second, it asks them how the 
threat of a terrorist attack in Britain concerns them. 
Both of these measures are tabulated in a scale from 1 
to 5 (from low to high). 
The  other  relevant  section  in  this  survey  is 
represented by a question concerning whether eight 
proposed policy measures should be implemented to 
reduce the risk of terrorism. Examples of these eight 
categories  include  compulsory  identity  cards,  the 
rights of terrorist suspects and the use of torture. The 
respondents’ answers are summarised in a scale from 
1  to  4.  The  higher  this  index  is,  the  higher  the 
willingness  to  trade  off  liberties  for  more  security. 
Figure 1 displays the perceived likelihood of an attack, 
the perceived personal threat and the willingness to 
trade off liberties for increased security. It is obvious 
that the attacks on 7/7 had a significant impact on all 
these  measures,  with  large  increases  registered  for 
each.  However,  after  a  few  months,  the  risk 
perceptions and policy preferences appear to diverge, 
with  risk  assessments  remaining  higher  for  an 
extended  period  of  time,  but  policy  preferences 
returning towards the pre-7/7 level. 
Following up on that analysis, it is also possible to see 
whether  different  groups  within  society  respond 
different to the occurrence of the London attacks. It is 
found that all major groups in society respond to the 
attacks  strongly,  with  relatively  homogeneous 
intensity.  Gender,  marital  status,  age,  education  and 
ideological orientation all seem to make no significant 
difference. The only exception to this is religion, where 
adherents of non-Christian religions 
increase  risk  perceptions 
significantly  more  than  Christians 
and  non-religious  respondents. 
Independent of the attacks, however, like in the cross-
country study, differences between groups are quite 
obvious,  although  there are  differences  between the 
perceived  likelihood  and  the  personal  threat.  For 
example,  while  males  perceive  the  likelihood  of  an 
attack to be larger, they believe the personal threat to 
be  smaller.  In  another  example,  being  married  does 
not affect the perceived risk of an attack, but increases 
the assessed personal threat. 
Finally,  we  can  assess  the  impact  of  demographic 
variables on the willingness to trade off civil liberties 
with  security.  Clearly,  a  respondent’s  estimated 
likelihood  and  personal  threat  of  terrorist  attacks 
increase  this  willingness  to  accept  the  trade-off.  In 
addition  to  that,  being  older,  having  children,  being 
Christian, being uneducated, being wealthy and being 
conservative  are  also  associated  with  a  larger 4 | EUSECON POLICY BRIEFING 9 NOVEMBER 2011  
 
willingness  to  sacrifice  civil  liberties.  However,  like 
can  be  observed  in  figure  1,  the  effect  of  the  7/7 
attacks  is  non-linear.  Immediately  after  the  attack, 
people are more willing to make the trade-off than at a 
later  stage,  even  though  levels  of  concern  are 
(permanently) higher. 
Policy recommendations 
In  this  Policy  Briefing,  we  look  at  two  main  issues. 
First, we look at what affects individuals’ perceptions 
concerning security. We find that these reflect to some 
extent  the  actual  terrorism  risk  in  the  country. 
However,  this  risk  is  differently  evaluated  across 
subgroups  of  the  population  with  particular 
characteristics. 
The second issue we look at is how an actual attack 
changes  the  preferences  concerning  anti-terrorism 
measures.  Going  beyond  the  existing  differences  in 
preferences  between  different  societal  groups,  the 
immediate increased demand for tougher measures is 
only  temporary.  In  the  longer  run,  a  singular  event 
does  not  affect  policy  preferences,  although  a 
permanently  higher  threat  level  does.  Policymakers 
are thus warned not to respond too strongly to short-
term changes in public opinion since these are largely 
driven by the immediate response to an attack and do 
not imply any structural change. 
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